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NOTE
INTRUSION, EXCLUSION, AND CONFUSION
STATE V. HELFRICH:
THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE AND ACTS OF PRIVATE PERSONS
Richard A. Reep
Suspecting that marijuana is being cultivated, a woman sur-
reptitiously enters her neighbor's garden, removes a leaf from a
plant and turns it over to the county sheriff's office. A deputy in-
vestigates and, based upon his observations and the leaf, applies
for and obtains a search warrant. Armed with the warrant the dep-
uty enters the neighbor's garden and removes a quantity of what
he believes to be marijuana. The neighbor is criminally charged
but moves to suppress the evidence as tainted by an unconstitu-
tional search and seizure. Must the evidence be suppressed?
The Montana Supreme Court faced this question in State v.
Helfrich1 and held that suppression was appropriate. Thus, Mon-
tana reaffirmed its unique position as the only state to apply the
controversial exclusionary rule to evidence procured through acts
of a private person. This note will examine the Helfrich decision in
light of prior Montana case law, United States Supreme Court de-
cisions and holdings from other states.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF MONTANA'S EXCLUSIONARY RULE
Since Weeks v. United States,2 the rule excluding evidence
procured by an unreasonable search and seizure has been a well
established, although controversial,3 method of enforcing the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.4 The
Court's two part rationale for the rule has been stated as deter-
rence of unconstitutional searches and seizures and maintenance of
1. - Mont. -, 600 P.2d 816 (1979).
2. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
3. One of the most vociferous opponents of the exclusionary rule during the Warren
Court era was Circuit Judge [now Chief Justice] Warren Burger. See, e.g., Killough v.
United States, 315 F.2d 241, 253 (D.C. Cir. 1962)(Burger, J., dissenting).
4. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
1
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judicial integrity.5 Although the emphasis has changed,' these rea-
sons are still recited as the basis of the rule.'
Six years after Weeks, the Supreme Court in Burdeau v. Mc-
DoweU1,8 limited the application of the exclusionary rule to acts of
the sovereign or its agents. Therefore, evidence procured by a pri-
vate person was not subject to exclusion even if obtained in an un-
reasonable manner.'
In 1921 the Montana Supreme Court adopted both the exclu-
sionary rule and the Supreme Court's rationale in State ex rel.
Samlin v. District Court.'0 Samlin and subsequent cases made it
clear that Montana's rule enforced the state's constitutional prohi-
bition against unreasonable searches and seizures and as such was
limited to state action."
In 1971, State v. Brecht 2 gave a new look to the exclusionary
rule in Montana. In Brecht, the court adopted the rationale set
forth by the United States Supreme Court in Katz v. United
States,3 and stated that the right protected by a constitutional
prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures was the right of
privacy. " However, the Montana court refused to limit the prohi-
bition to acts of the sovereign or its agents and instead extended
the application of the exclusionary rule to the act of a private
person.'
In Brecht and subsequent cases the Montana Supreme Court
has stated that because it was construing Montana's constitutional
provision on search and seizure it would not be bound by the
United States Supreme Court's version of the exclusionary rule.'6
Emphasizing both an independent and expanded application of the
5. See, e.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392-93 (1914); Wolf v. Colorado,
338 U.S. 25, 31 (1949).
6. Early cases on the exclusionary rule emphasized the judicial integrity rationale
while the modern court's focus is on the deterrent effect of the rule. Compare Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383, 394 (1914) with Stone v., Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 484-86 (1976).
7. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656-59 (1961); Calandra v. United States, 414
U.S. 338, 347-48 (1974).
8. 256 U.S. 465 (1921).
9. Id. at 476.
10. 59 Mont. 600, 198 P. 362 (1921).
11. Id. at 609, 198 P. at 365; accord, State ex rel. King v. District Court, 70 Mont. 191,
196, 224 P. 862, 864 (1924); State ex rel. Sadler v. District Court, 70 Mont. 378, 389, 225 P.
1000, 1003 (1924).
12. 157 Mont. 264, 485 P.2d 47 (1971).
13. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
14. Brecht, 157 Mont. at 270, 485 P.2d at 50.
15. Id. at 270-71, 485 P.2d at 51.
16. See, e.g., State v. Coburn, 165 Mont. 488, 530 P.2d 442 (1974).
282 [Vol. 41
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exclusionary rule, State v. Helfrich" stands in marked contrast to
recent Supreme Court decisions limiting the applicability of the
exclusionary rule under the federal constitution. 8
II. STATE V. HELFRICH
A. The Facts
Mildred Arnold had lived as neighbor to Richard and Janet
Helfrich of Willow Creek, Montana, for several years. During the
summer of 1978 Arnold observed from her garden activities on the
Helfrich property which led her to suspect that the Helfrichs were
raising marijuana. Arnold telephoned the sheriff's office and re-
ported her observations and suspicions. A deputy was dispatched
but after investigating and seeing no marijuana he closed the case.
Three days later Arnold entered the Helfrich property and re-
moved a leaf from one of the plants she suspected to be marijuana.
She turned the leaf over to the sheriff's office where it was identi-
fied as marijuana. Officers then proceeded to Willow Creek where
they observed and photographed marijuana in Helfrich's garden.
Based upon Arnold's testimony and evidence, as well as the of-
ficer's observations and photographs, a search warrant was issued.
On August 3, 1978, officers seized 392 plants alleged to be ma-
rijuana from the Helfrich garden. Helfrich was charged with crimi-
nal sale of dangerous drugs but the district court suppressed the
evidence because of faulty probable cause."9
B. The Decision
The court, with Justice Harrison dissenting,2 0 held:
[T]he right of individual privacy explicitly guaranteed by the
State Constitution is inviolate and the search and seizure provi-
17. - Mont. -, 600 P.2d 816 (1979).
18. See, e.g., Calandra v. United States, 414 U.S. 338 (1974). The Court in Calandra
adopted a balancing test and stated that the exclusionary rule would be applied only where
its purpose would be "efficaciously served." Id. at 348. See also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465 (1976). The Court in Stone refused to grant habeas corpus relief to a state prisoner
where the state had provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of the issue and
where the benefits of furthering Fourth Amendment protection were outweighed by the
costs to the criminal system. Id. at 494-95.
19. In order to clarify the circumstances surrounding the incident, the facts are taken
from the transcripts and findings of the district court as well as from the reported case.
20. Justice Harrison based his dissent on what he saw as an improper expansion of the
exclusionary rule. Noting his dissent in both State v. Brecht, 157 Mont. 264, 485 P.2d 47
(1971) and State v. Coburn, 165 Mont. 488, 530 P.2d 442 (1974), Justice Harrison declined
to join in what he described as an extension of the exclusionary rule "beyond any logical
purpose." Helfrich, - Mont. at -, 600 P.2d at 819 (Harrison, J., dissenting).
3
Reep: Intrusion, Exclusion, and Confusion
Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1980
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
sions of Montana law apply to private individuals as well as law
enforcement officers. Evidence obtained through illegal invasions
of individual privacy are not to be admitted into evidence in a
court of law of this State.2
The holding in Helfrich was based squarely on Montana's con-
stitutional provisions on privacy" and search and seizure.23 The
court concluded that the sample of marijuana procured by Arnold
was the only credible evidence presented in support of the search
warrant. Since the sample had been obtained during an illegal tres-
pass, the majority had little trouble finding that the trespass vio-
lated Helfrich's right to privacy. As a "fruit of an illegal invasion"
24
of that right the sample was inadmissible under Montana's search
and seizure clause. Therefore, because Arnold's sample provided
the only basis for the search warrant, the subsequent search and
seizure was both illegal and unreasonable and the evidence seized
had been properly excluded by the district court.
C. An Analysis
The court's decision rests on three premises: (1) Montana's
constitutional right of privacy prohibits invasions by private per-
sons as well as the state; (2) an illegal trespass on another's prop-
erty is an invasion of that person's right of privacy; and (3) where a
private person violates another's right of privacy in procuring evi-
dence of a crime, the proper remedy is exclusion of that evidence.
The remainder of this note examines each of these premises
separately.
1. Montana's constitutional right of privacy prohibits invasion
by private persons as well as the state
Although ten of the fifty states have express provisions for pri-
vacy in their constitutions, 5 only Montana has construed the right
21. Id. at __, 600 P.2d at 819.
22. "Right of Privacy. The right of individual privacy is essential to the well being of
free society and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest."
MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10.
23. Searches and Seizures. The people shall be secure in their persons, papers,
homes, and effects from unreasonable searches and seizures. No warrant to search
any place, or seize any person or thing shall issue without describing the place to
be searched or the person or thing to be seized, or without probable cause, sup-
ported by oath or affirmation reduced to writing.
MONT. CONST. art. II, § 11.
24. Helfrich, - Mont. at -, 600 P.2d at 817.
25. ALAS. CONST. art. 1, § 22; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 8; CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 1; FLA.
CONST. art. I, § 12; HAWAII CONsT. art. 1, § 5; ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 6; LA. CONST. art. 1, § 5;
[Vol. 41
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as a prohibition applicable to acts of private persons. Of the other
nine states having privacy provisions in their constitutions, Alaska,
California, Washington, and Arizona are of most interest to Mon-
tana since each has a provision for privacy separate from its search
and seizure provision. Both Washington and Arizona provide for
protection of "private affairs""6 in their constitutions. Interpreta-
tion of these provisions has been limited almost exclusively to mat-
ters involving search and seizure. 7 In no case has the prohibition
been applied against a private person without a showing of state
involvement, and in one Arizona case the court stated flatly that
the constitutional prohibition applied only to state action. 8
California and Alaska have expressly provided for the right of
privacy in their constitutions." California amended its section on
enumerated inalienable rights to include privacy and in doing so
clearly indicated that the right prohibited violations by private
persons as well as the state.30 However, no case in California has
extended protection of the right beyond acts of the state or its
agents. Alaska's provision for privacy is similar to Montana's, yet
the Alaska courts have limited its application to state activities.3 1
Thus, it appears well settled in forty-nine states and under the
United States Constitution that privacy, even where specifically
provided for in the state's constitution, will be enforced only as a
prohibition against acts of the sovereign or its agents.
3 2
MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10; S. C. CONST. art. 1, § 10; WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 7.
26. "No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without
authority of law." WASH. CONsT. art. 1, § 7; ARIz. CONST. art. II, § 8.
27. See generally Comment, Toward a Right of Privacy as a Matter of State Consti-
tutional Law, 5 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 633 (1977).
28. Cluff v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 10 Ariz. App. 560, 460 P.2d 666, 669 (1969).
29. "All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights.
Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protect-
ing property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy." CAL. CONST. art 1,
§ 1. "The right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed. The legisla-
ture shall implement this section." ALAS. CONST. art. 1, § 22.
30. The election brochure circulated when the amendment to include privacy was be-
ing voted on stated that "at present there are no effective restraints on the informative
activities of government and business. This amendment creates a legal and enforceable right
of privacy for every Californian." Election Brochure, Argument in Favor of Proposition 11.
31. See, e.g., Allred v. State, 554 P.2d 411, 416 (1976), Falcon v. Alaska Public Offices
Commission, 570 P.2d 469, 476 (1977). Although Alaska has limited the application of its
right of privacy, the protection it provides against governmental intrusions far exceeds that
given by the Montana court. See, e.g., Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 511 (1975)(holding that
possession of marijuana by adults at home for personal use is constitutionally protected). Cf.
State ex rel. Zander v. District Court, - Mont. -, 591 P.2d 656, 660 (1979)(holding that
the state's interest in protecting property was a compelling state interest sufficient to justify
an officer's presence on the defendant's property and that officers subsequent seizure of
marijuana discovered was reasonable).
32. The principle that the United States Constitution applies only to the sovereign or
5
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The first indication that the Montana Supreme Court held a
broader view of the right of privacy came in 1952 in Welsh v. Ro-
ehm.35 Welsh was a tort action for damages resulting from a con-
tinuing trespass. Deciding that the defendant's continuing illegal
presence constituted a violation of the plaintiff's right of privacy,
the court allowed damages. However, the source of plaintiff's right
of privacy is difficult to discern from the decision since the court's
rationale ranged from a common law concept of privacy 4 to cita-
tion of decisions based on the United States Constitution.85 Never-
theless, nineteen years later in State v. Brecht,"5 Welsh was cited
as establishing a "right of privacy based on the Montana Constitu-
tion and enforceable against a private person.
7
In Brecht, a man telephoned his wife and threatened to shoot
her. His wife's sister, listening in on another extension, overheard
the conversation. When the wife was shot and killed a short time
later the district court allowed the sister to testify as to what she
overheard. The supreme court reversed. Reasoning that Brecht's
right of privacy was protected under the search and seizure provi-
sions of both the state and federal constitutions, the court held
that evidence of Brecht's telephone conversation with his wife had
been procured in violation of that right and as such was in-
admissable under the exclusionary rule. Refusing to distinguish be-
tween state and private action, 8 the court cited Katz v. United
States"9 and Welsh v. Roehm" as support for a general right of
privacy in the federal and state constitutions.
The court's reliance on Katz is clearly misplaced. Katz explic-
itly limits the application of the right of privacy under the Fourth
its agents has long been recognized. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
[T]he Fourth Amendment cannot be translated into a general constitutional right
to privacy. That Amendment protects individual privacy against certain kinds of
governmental intrusion, but its protections go further, and often have nothing to
do with privacy at all. Other provisions of the Constitution protect personal pri-
vacy from other forms of governmental invasion. But the protection of a person's
general right to privacy-his right to be let alone by other people-is, -like the
protection of his property and of his very life, left largely to the law of the individ-
ual states. [Citations and footnotes omitted].
Id. at 350-51.
33. 125 Mont. 517, 241 P.2d 816 (1952).
34. Id. at 523, 241 P.2d at 819.
35. Id.
36. 157 Mont. 264, 485 P.2d 47 (1971).
37. Id. at 270, 485 P.2d at 50-51.
38. Addressing the issue of enforcement of the right against private persons as well as
the state, the court stated: "To distinguish between classes of violators is tantamount to
destruction of the right itself." Brecht, 157 Mont. at 270, 485 P.2d at 51.
39. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
40. 125 Mont. 517, 241 P.2d 816 (1952).
[Vol. 41
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Amendment to governmental instrusions." Likewise, Welsh pro-
vides a tenuous basis for a general right of privacy. As a tort action
the basis of the right was never firmly established. Furthermore,
the court in Brecht simply overlooked the fact that the privacy
issue in Welsh arose only as a basis for extended damages after a
trespass was found. Brecht attempts to transform a basis for a re-
medial tort action into a constitutional prohibition.
Roundly criticized for its decision in Brecht,42 the court of-
fered a more complete explanation and justification of the Brecht
holding in State v. Coburn.43 Like Brecht, Coburn involved evi-
dence procured by a private person and once again the court held
that suppression was appropriate." Although the 1972 Montana
Constitution was in effect at the time Coburn was decided, the
court paid little attention to its privacy provision. Instead, the
court focused on what it felt was the more liberal interpretation of
the United States Constitution under Katz v. United States4' and
Elkins v. United States.4'6 Neither of these cases, however, applies
the exclusionary rule to evidence procured through acts of a pri-
vate person.
The applicability of Montana's privacy provision in the 1972
Montana Constitution was finally addressed in State v. Helfrich.
The court cited Brecht for its application of the right of privacy
under the 1889 Montana Constitution to both private and govern-
mental action and then began an analysis of the 1972 Constitu-
tional Convention transcripts. Seizing on two paragraphs from the
transcripts, the court concluded that the framers of the constitu-
tion intended that the right of privacy should protect persons
against both governmental and private violations.'
41. See note 32 supra.
42. See, e.g., Note, State v. Brecht: Evolution or Offshoot of the Fourth Amendment
Exclusionary Rule?, 34 MoNT. L. REV. 187 (1973); Elison, Criminal Procedure-Montana
Law and the Federal Impact, 38 MoNT. L. REV. 27, 46-47 (1977).
43. 165 Mont. 488, 530 P.2d 442 (1974).
44. In Coburn, a restaurant manager was informed that an employee had marijuana in
his coat pocket. The manager contacted the police and discussed the problem. Immediately
after the discussion the manager seized the marijuana from the employee's coat and turned
it over to the police. Noting the manager's association and cooperation with the police prior
to the seizure, the court held that sufficient facts had been shown to exclude the evidence
under either the "state action" doctrine or the rationale of the Brecht case. Coburn, 165
Mont. at 505, 530 P.2d at 451.
45. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
46. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
47. The first paragraph was quoted in the opinion as follows:
Certainly, back in 1776, 1789, when they developed our bill of rights, the search
and seizure provisions were enough, when a man's home was his castle and the
state could not intrude upon this home without the procuring of a search warrant
7
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It is undeniable that the portions of the transcripts cited by
the court in Helfrich indicate a preference for a broad application
of the right of privacy. However, when the transcripts are read as a
whole the court's interpretation loses its cogency. Repeated refer-
ences in the transcripts to the relationship between private persons
and the state and the delegates' citation of a leading United States
Supreme Court decision on privacy and governmental intrusions,
compel an interpretation contrary to that of the court in
Helfrich.
48
By interpreting Montana's constitutional right of privacy as a
prohibition against private as well as state action, the court took a
position contrary to the courts of other states, the United States
Supreme Court and, arguably, the intention of the framers of Mon-
tana's constitution.
2. An illegal trespass on another's property is an invasion of
that person's right of privacy.
Any right of privacy must be defined by some limits. Histori-
cally, property principles were called upon as a basis for finding
with probable cause being stated before a magistrate and a search warrant being
issued. No other protection was necessary and this certainly was the greatest
amount of protection that any free society has given its individuals. In that type
of society, of course, the neighbor was maybe three or four miles away. There was
no real infringement upon the individual and his right of privacy. However, today
we have observed an increasingly complex society and we know our area of privacy
has decreased, decreased and decreased ....
Helfrich, - Mont. at -, 600 P.2d at 818, citing Transcript of the Montana Constitutional
Convention 5182. The second paragraph was quoted as follows:
It isn't only a careless government that has this power to pry, political organiza-
tions, private information gathering firms, and even an individual can now snoop
more easily and more effectively than ever before ...
Helfrich, - Mont. at -, 600 P.2d 818, citing Transcript of the Montana Constitutional
Convention 5182.
48. The court omitted that portion of the statement which cited Griswold v. United
States, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The balance of the delegates' statement reported in part by the
court in Helfrich (note 44 supra) reads as follows:
[Ilt produces what I would call a semi-permeable wall of separation between indi-
viduals and state; just as the wall of separation between church and state is abso-
lute, the wall of separation we are proposing with this section would be semi-
permeable. That is, as a participating member of society we all recognize that the
state must come into our private lives at some point, but what it says is, don't
come into our private lives unless you have a good reason for being there. We feel
that this, as a mandate to our government, would cause a complete re-examina-
tion and guarantee our individual citizens of Montana this very important right
... . [emphasis added]
Transcript of the Montana Constitutional Convention 5181-82. The second paragraph set
forth in note 44 supra was actually the delegate reading from a newspaper editorial which
supported an expanded right of privacy to meet individual needs as "govermental frustra-
tions and controls expanded." Transcript of the Montana Constitutional Convention 5183.
8
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and defining these limits. The modern approach, taken by both
state and federal courts, is the principle adopted in Katz v. United
States. Katz stated that the right of privacy protects people, not
places.49 Montana's reliance upon this principle is expressed in sev-
eral cases, but perhaps the most definitive statement is found in
State v. Charvat.0 The court in Charvat concluded that where an
individual's subjective expectations of privacy were objectively rea-
sonable the right of privacy existed.5 1 Despite the adoption of this
more liberal test, the court upheld a warrantless seizure of mari-
juana from a field even though the marijuana was not visible from
outside the defendant's property. The court reasoned that even if
the defendant had subjective expectations of privacy they were not
objectively reasonable under the "open fields '5 2 exception. Thus,
in Charvat, a trespass by police did not result in a violation of the
defendant's right to privacy.
The open fields doctrine should not be the basis of an excep-
tion to the right of privacy. The open fields doctrine was formu-
lated in 19245' when the property principles of constitutionally
protected areas provided the limits of Fourth Amendment protec-
tion. This concept was repudiated in Katz. However, even though
property principles can no longer be used to limit Fourth Amend-
ment protection it does not follow that a person's reliance on prop-
erty principles, when forming an expectation of privacy, is either
subjectively or objectively unreasonable. Reliance on state and
public respect for property may, in some circumstances, be viewed
as a basis for a reasonable expectation of privacy.54 It may be that
an open field is not a place where one can reasonably expect pri-
vacy, but the Katz test should be applied rather than rejecting the
privacy claim on the basis of an exception founded in property
principles.
49. Katz, 389 U.S. at 512.
50. - Mont. -, 573 P.2d 660 (1978).
51. Id. at -, 573 P.2d at 663.
52. The "open fields" doctrine was first announced in Hester v. United States, 265
U.S. 57 (1924). In Hester, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment extends only to "per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects" and refused to extend the protection to open fields. Id. at
59.
53. See note 52 supra.
54. For instance, where a person's land is conspicuously posted, privacy could be both
subjectively and objectively reasonable if consideration is given to Montana's statutory pro-
hibition against entry. MONTANA CODE ANNOTATED §§ 46-6-201, -203 (1979). For an excellent
discussion of the United States Supreme Court's use of property principles for limiting,
extending, and defining the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy, see O'Brien, Reasonable
Expectations of Privacy: Principles and Policies of Fourth Amendment-Protected Privacy,
13 Naw ENGLAND L. REV. 662, 704-37 (1978).
9
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To state that an illegal trespass violates a right of privacy also
confuses the right of privacy with property principles. The ques-
tion should be whether or not the person expected privacy, and if
so, whether that expectation was objectively reasonable. Thus, not
all trespasses are invasions of privacy just as not all invasions of
privacy are trespasses. The two issues are based on separate princi-
ples. If privacy is the basis for excluding unreasonably obtained
evidence then the question of trespass is, and must remain, only a
collateral issue.
3. Where a private person violates another's right of privacy in
procuring evidence of a crime, the proper remedy is exclusion of
that evidence.
The historical development and application of the exclusion-
ary rule indicates that both the United States Supreme Court and
the Montana Supreme Court regard privacy as the right protected
by search and seizure provisions. They also agree that the protec-
tion is indirect in that exclusion of evidence unconstitutionally ob-
tained will not repair the harm done but only tends to deter future
violations. They disagree, however, upon the exclusionary rule's
applicability to unreasonable searches and seizures by a private
person. This disagreement and Montana's unique application of
the rule leads to some confusion as to what the court actually sees
as the reason behind the rule.
In Helfrich, evidence was excluded without comment on the
deterrent value of the exclusion. In cases where the police violate
the defendant's privacy, exclusion of the evidence should deter fu-
ture violations. But even in those cases the court has felt com-
pelled to comment on deterrence and at times has rejected the rule
where deterrence was minimal.55 In Helfrich, the apparent auto-
matic exclusion of evidence upon finding a violation of the defen-
dant's right of privacy, invites speculation as to what the court
perceives to be the status of the rule and its deterrent value.
Automatic application of the rule upon finding a constitu-
tional violation tends to treat the rule either as a means of repair-
ing a constitutional harm or as a constitutional mandate. The rule
was not designed to repair.5 6 It offers no reparation in the case of
55. In State v. Thorsness, 165 Mont. 321, 528 P.2d 692 (1974), the court refused to
apply the exclusionary rule where the deterrent value would be minimal. Thorsness involved
a probation revocation action but indicated a willingness of the court to apply the balancing
test developed by the Burger Court. Id. at 326, 528 P.2d at 695.
56. The Montana Supreme Court states this proposition in State v. Thorsness, 165
Mont. 321, 326, 528 P.2d 692, 695 (1974).
[Vol. 41
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an unreasonable search and seizure which yields no criminal evi-
dence. The rule's remedy is limited to a person who has both com-
mitted a crime and been the object of an unreasonable search and
seizure. A rule whose value is limited to repairing harms done to
this class of persons is irrational.
The exclusionary rule is not mandated by either the federal or
state constitutions.5 7 Rather, it is a judicially developed rule of evi-
dence designed to prevent constitutional violations. Therefore,
where the rule presents no deterrent value it should have no con-
stitutional imperative. 8
The rule has only minimal deterrent value when applied to
private persons.59 It deters by rendering the fruits of an unreasona-
ble search and seizure inadmissible as evidence. Removal of this
incentive should, logically, reduce violations and therefore benefit
all who can claim a right of privacy. However, reduced violations
will result only if the potential violators are aware of the rule.
Aside from the news media there exists no effective method of in-
forming the general public of the rule. Even where the public be-
comes aware of the rule they may not appreciate or understand its
ultimate value and simply ignore it.
A final justification for the automatic application of the exclu-
sionary rule is the argument for judicial integrity. That is, the
courts should not sanction the use of evidence which was illegally
obtained. The philosophical purity of this argument is generally
outweighed by the practical problem of freeing a criminal in the
face of evidence of his crime while society is forced to bear the
costs of both the procurer's and the criminal's illegal activity.
Thus, modern courts have largely ignored this argument and relied
upon deterrence to justify the rule.60
57. The court stated as much in State v. Coburn, 165 Mont. 488, 499, 530 P.2d 442,
448 (1974):
Concerning the exclusionary rule itself, it would be well to consider first that the
"exclusionary rule" is a court adopted rule resting on the "rule making" and "su-
pervisory power" of the Supreme Court over the other courts and has no roots in
the constitution or statutes of the state or federal government.
58. This is the position taken by the Burger Court when it adopted its balancing test
in Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974)(refusing to extend the rule to grand jury proceedings
where the deterrent value to police conduct was outweighed by the costs to the system).
59. A second argument for application or adoption of the exclusionary rule is "judicial
integrity." That argument is discussed at the end of this section in this note.
60. See, e.g., Calandra v. United States, 414 U.S. 338, 360(1974); State v. Thorsness,
165 Mont. 321, 528 P.2d 692 (1974). "Its purpose is to deter - to compel respect for the
constitutional guaranty in the only effectually available way - by removing the incentive to
disregard it." Id. at 326, 528 P.2d at 695, citing Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217
(1960).
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III. CONCLUSION
State v. Helfrich stands as the court's second opportunity in
the past five years to correct its misapplication of the exclusionary
rule. It now seems certain that the rule applies to all searches and
seizures by private persons where the defendant's right of privacy
is violated. Less certain, however, is the court's reason for clinging
to this broad application. Neither the historical foundation of the
rule nor the modern concept of the right of privacy supports such
an automatic and sweeping application.
Deterrence, the major justification for the rule, was never ad-
dressed in Helfrich. Instead, the court automatically applied the
rule after deciding that the defendant's right of privacy had been
violated. The court's application of the exclusionary rule in Hel-
frich sets a confusing standard and threatens to elevate the rule to
a constitutional imperative, a status which it has never before
held. 1 Constitutional status may prevent the demise of the contro-
versial rule should a more workable method be devised by the leg-
islature for protecting Fourth Amendment rights.
61. See note 57 supra.
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